Part One: International Obligations And Procedures
Introduction
The Republic of Pelagosa has undertaken a series of nuclear tests on its portion of Greenhaven Island, displacing the indigenous Iskari people and returning them to an environment that is now irradiated and ecologically unstable. Although Greenhaven is a territory shared with neighbouring Aquilora, Pelagosa acted unilaterally in detonating fifteen underground and atmospheric nuclear devices, followed by seven additional atmospheric tests. These events have raised significant concerns under multiple bodies of international law, including human rights law, international environmental law, and global nuclear disarmament treaties.
This essay examines the international legal obligations binding upon Pelagosa, assesses whether the conduct in question constitutes a breach of those obligations, and explores the legal mechanisms through which Pelagosa may be held accountable. It concludes by identifying the State’s potential liability and outlining the forms of state responsibility and reparation required under international law.
Treaty and Customary Law
As a United Nations Member State, Pelagosa is bound by the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. [1] Although Pelagosa has not directly threatened Aquilora with force, the nuclear tests on shared territory raise legal issues under Article 33, which obliges Member States to resolve disputes through peaceful means. [2]
Notably, both Pelagosa and Aquilora have submitted optional clause declarations under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), meaning either State may initiate proceedings before the Court to resolve such disputes. [3]
Human Rights Treaties
Pelagosa has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the First Optional Protocol. [4] These instruments allow individuals under the State’s jurisdiction to lodge complaints with the Human Rights Committee. [5] The facts in question suggest serious violations of the ICCPR, particularly Articles 6, 7, and 27. The right to life under Article 6 has been compromised by the radioactive contamination of Greenhaven, which threatens the health, livelihood, and long-term survival of the Iskari people. [6]
The return of the displaced community to a hazardous environment, without independent safety assessments or basic services, further engages Article 7, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. [7] This is particularly relevant given the psychological distress and physical risks involved. Article 27 protects the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture and way of life. [8]
The destruction of Greenhaven’s natural resources including fishing waters, arable land, and sacred spaces, has effectively undermined the Iskari’s ability to maintain their cultural identity. As international law scholar and former human rights commissioner Dinah Shelton notes, such environmental degradation can result in indirect but serious violations of civil and political rights, including the rights to life, health, and culture.[9]
Genocide Convention and Broader Criminal Liability
In addition to human rights treaties, Pelagosa is a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. [10] Article II of the Convention defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.[11] While there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Pelagosa acted with genocidal intent, the cumulative effect of the displacement, environmental contamination, and cultural erasure raises questions about whether the Iskari people were targeted in a discriminatory or negligent manner.
If systematic neglect or state policy can be shown to have had the foreseeable effect of eradicating the Iskari’s existence on Greenhaven, Pelagosa could potentially face allegations not only under the Genocide Convention but also under broader prohibitions against crimes against humanity. [12]
Disarmament Treaties
From a disarmament perspective, Pelagosa has breached its obligations under two key treaties: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). [13]
The CTBT imposes a general prohibition on all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes. [14] Pelagosa’s twenty-two tests, fifteen underground and seven atmospheric constitute a direct violation of this treaty. The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, prohibits the development, testing, production, stockpiling, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pelagosa’s nuclear programme, including its active testing regime and stockpiling of nuclear components, is incompatible with the treaty’s fundamental prohibitions. [15]
These treaties signal a strong and growing consensus within the international community against the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Pelagosa’s conduct stands in stark contrast to these evolving global norms.
Customary International Environmental Law
Beyond treaty obligations, Pelagosa is also bound by customary international law, particularly the no-harm principle and the duty of due diligence. [16] The no-harm principle, affirmed in the Trail Smelter arbitration and the ICJ’s Nuclear Tests cases, prohibits a State from permitting activities within its jurisdiction that cause significant transboundary environmental harm. [17]
The duty of due diligence requires States to take all reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable environmental damage. The uncontrolled spread of radioactive debris, particularly due to Pelagosa’s failure to anticipate seasonal storms, suggests a clear violation, of this norm. Pelagosa’s failure to conduct adequate environmental assessments, secure the test sites, or consult neighbouring states reinforces the conclusion that it did not meet this standard. [18]
In addition, Pelagosa has signed (but not ratified) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. [19] While signature does not give rise to full treaty obligations, it nevertheless entails a duty under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. [20]
Pelagosa’s conduct, particularly its failure to provide safe living conditions, education, medical care, and protection to affected children, raises concerns under these instruments. Although not strictly binding, these treaties further inform expectations of state conduct and reinforce the broader legal and ethical framework within which Pelagosa’s actions must be assessed.
Accountability Mechanisms
Several international legal mechanisms may be invoked to challenge Pelagosa’s conduct. First, individual members of the Iskari community may submit communications to the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. [21] These complaints may allege violations of the right to life, protection from inhuman treatment, and the rights of minority communities. If upheld, the Committee can recommend compensation, access to health services, and guarantees of non-repetition. [22]
Second, Aquilora may institute proceedings against Pelagosa before the ICJ. [23]The Court could hear claims relating to violations of customary international law, treaty breaches under the CTBT and TPNW, and any human rights impacts with extraterritorial effect. Aquilora would need to demonstrate direct harm, such as contamination of its territory or infringement of its environmental or sovereign rights. [24]
Third, political processes within the United Nations remain available. The UN General Assembly may issue a resolution condemning Pelagosa’s actions or seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, could determine that Pelagosa’s nuclear tests constitute a threat to international peace and security and respond with sanctions or enforcement measures. [25]
Legal Consequences and State Responsibility
If Pelagosa is found to have committed internationally wrongful acts, it is obliged to make full reparation in accordance with the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). [26] Under Article 31, reparation must fully address the injury caused. Article 35 provides for restitution, which could include environmental remediation or relocation assistance. Article 36 permits financial compensation, particularly for loss of livelihood, health costs, or cultural disruption. Under Article 37, the State may be required to issue formal acknowledgment of wrongdoing and a public apology. [27]
In addition to reparations, Pelagosa must take all feasible steps to prevent further harm. [28] This includes conducting environmental audits, implementing remediation plans, and cooperating with Aquilora or UN agencies to stabilise the region. Finally, the State may be required to provide guarantees of non-repetition, such as completely dismantling nuclear test sites, consenting to international inspections, or signing additional protocols to disarmament treaties. [29]
Conclusion
Pelagosa’s actions on Greenhaven Island constitute serious breaches of its obligations under international law. The displacement of the Iskari people, environmental destruction, and nuclear testing all violate a combination of treaty-based and customary norms. The ICCPR, CTBT, TPNW, and principles of environmental due diligence are particularly relevant.
Pelagosa now faces a credible risk of individual complaints, state-to-state litigation, and international condemnation. To limit legal exposure and restore confidence in its international standing, Pelagosa must adopt immediate policy reforms, provide remedies to the affected population, and cooperate with international legal and environmental bodies to address the harm it has caused.
Part Two: Individual Human Rights Complaint Under The ICCPR
I submit this communication under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as a member of the Iskari people, a long-established ethnic minority on Greenhaven Island. [30] I allege that the Republic of Pelagosa has violated Articles 6, 7, and 27 of the ICCPR through the forced displacement of our community, nuclear contamination of our homeland, and erosion of our cultural life. [31]
On 3 January 2021, Pelagosan military personnel removed our community from Greenhaven with no notice, promising a brief relocation. During our absence, the government conducted fifteen nuclear tests, followed by seven additional atmospheric detonations. When we returned in August, we found the environment severely degraded. No safety checks were carried out. Dead fish lined the shore, our crops failed, and illness spread. Requests for support were dismissed by officials invoking national security.
Under Article 6 of the ICCPR, States are required to protect the inherent right to life. By exposing us to unassessed radiation and failing to prevent foreseeable harm, Pelagosa has breached this obligation. The long-term environmental damage presents ongoing risks to our health and survival. [32]
Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Forcing us back to an unsafe and contaminated environment, while denying access to clean water, healthcare, or support services, has caused lasting physical and psychological harm. This treatment, combined with government inaction, amounts to inhuman treatment. [33]
Under Article 27, minorities have the right to enjoy their culture and traditions. Our identity is tied to the land and sea; through farming, fishing, and sacred places. Nuclear contamination has rendered these practices impossible. We were not consulted before the testing, nor included in any restoration planning. Our culture has been endangered without any effort to preserve it. [34]
- “Article 27 confers a right which is separate and distinct from the other rights... and may not be subject to restriction.”
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23 (1994) on Article 27, [para 1]. [35]
Pelagosa has ratified both the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, making this Committee competent to consider our case. [36] Domestic remedies have been exhausted; Pelagosan courts have declined to hear our claims, citing national security. We have no other legal avenues within the State.
Additionally, Pelagosa has signed, but not ratified, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. [37] While not legally binding on their own, these instruments reinforce global expectations that States must uphold human dignity and provide effective protection against harm.
I respectfully request that the Committee find Pelagosa in breach of Articles 6, 7, and 27 of the ICCPR. [38] I further request that it recommend independent medical and environmental assessments of Greenhaven, public disclosure of findings, and reparations for health impacts, economic loss, and cultural damage. The Committee should also urge Pelagosa to cease all future nuclear testing and consult with our community in all future decisions affecting our land. [39]
We have not come before the Committee lightly. Our homes, health, and heritage have been endangered by State conduct that disregards our humanity. We seek only recognition of our rights, restoration of our land, and protection for our future.
Part Three: ICJ Advisory Opinion On Nuclear Weapons And Environmental Harm
Introduction
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, acknowledging the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons yet stopping short of declaring them unlawful in all circumstances. [40] Paragraph (E) of the dispositive and paragraph [33] left open the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used lawfully in extreme self-defence. This part argues that while the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion acknowledged environmental law’s relevance, it failed to apply it meaningfully. [41]
Environmental Reasoning in the 1996 Opinion
The ICJ affirmed to and referenced, Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit warfare causing widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage. [42]
The Court also cited Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration but treated this as soft law without binding effect. This limited their application despite their broad acceptance in environmental law. [43]
Paragraph [33] of the Advisory Opinion encapsulates this ambiguity: the Court acknowledged that nuclear weapon use would “generally be contrary” to international humanitarian law but refrained from declaring it unlawful in all scenarios. [44] Paragraph (E) similarly avoided a categorical finding, stating that the Court could not definitively conclude whether such use would be lawful or unlawful in extreme self-defence. This cautious approach weakened environmental norms and granted states broad discretion. [45]
Academic Critique and Competing Views
Leading scholars have criticised this legal ambiguity. Birnie and Boyle contend that by treating key environmental principles as soft law, the ICJ undermined their normative potential. [46] Although they acknowledge the emergence of an international environmental legal framework, they argue that the Court’s reluctance to affirm a definitive legal position reflects an overly cautious approach that missed a crucial opportunity to consolidate environmental principles within the structure of international law. [47]
Critics particularly target the disconnect between the ICJ’s recognition of severe environmental harm and its refusal to find legal liability. Despite acknowledging that radiation effects are inherently transboundary and irreversible, the Court deferred to speculative scenarios of extreme necessity.
Legal Developments Since 1996
Since the Opinion, treaty and customary laws have advanced. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), provides a categorical prohibition on nuclear arms, including obligations to remediate environmental harm and assist victims. [48]
UN Special Rapporteurs have played a critical role in investigating environmental harms, particularly where such harms intersect with human rights violations affecting vulnerable populations. [49] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has likewise deployed technical missions to conduct independent fact-finding and assess State compliance with international obligations. [50]
Complementing these efforts, domestic environmental impact assessment regimes, such as those outlined by the Australian Government’s Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, demonstrate how national systems can integrate international environmental principles into regulatory practice, reinforcing the duty of due diligence through pre-approval screening and long-term monitoring of high-risk projects. [51]These mechanisms together reflect an evolving consensus that environmental law is not suspended during crisis or conflict but remains central to both human rights protection and legal accountability. [52]
A Likely Shift in 2025
In this context, the ICJ would be well-positioned to reach a firmer conclusion in 2025. The precautionary principle, now widely accepted, requires avoidance of actions that risk irreversible harm.
Furthermore, environmental integrity is now viewed as integral to state responsibility. The ICJ should reframe nuclear use as incompatible with Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I and with customary norms on necessity and proportionality under Article 51 of the UN Charter. [53] The Court should conclude that no lawful scenario exists where nuclear weapons use meets the threshold of environmental law compliance. Such a finding would not only align with evolving treaty and customary norms but affirm the moral and legal imperatives of disarmament.
Conclusion
The ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion acknowledged the relevance of environmental law but failed to give it decisive legal force. By leaving open the possibility of lawful nuclear weapon use in extreme self-defence, the Court introduced ambiguity that weakened environmental norms. Scholars such as Birnie and Boyle have rightly criticised this reluctance, arguing that it undermined the consolidation of environmental principles within international law. While some view this as judicial caution, the ICJ’s advisory function is not constrained by political considerations in the same way as contentious cases, it is empowered to shape legal norms proactively.
With the emergence of the TPNW, strengthened customary law, and growing international recognition of environmental protection as a legal imperative, the Court now has both the legal and moral justification to declare the use of nuclear weapons incompatible with international law. A clear ruling in 2025 would not only align with evolving treaty and customary norms but would also affirm the collective responsibility of states to safeguard both humanity and the planet from irreversible harm.
Treaties and International Instruments
Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (opened for signature 10 September 1996, not yet in force)
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (opened for signature 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277
Convention on the Rights of the Child (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 302
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) (opened for signature 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992)
Statute of the International Court of Justice (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 7 July 2017, entered into force 22 January 2021) UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331
Cases and Advisory Opinions
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226
Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) (1938–41) 3 RIAA 1905
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7
United Nations Documents
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 50th sess, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994)
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36: Article 6 (Right to Life), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 2018)
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001)
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001)
GA Res 75/40, UN Doc A/RES/75/40 (7 December 2020)
Books and Journal Articles
Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 1992)
Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recognized?’ (2006) 35(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 129
Government Reports and Web Sources
Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Multilateral Assessment: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (Report, March 2012)
Australian Government Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, National Environment Law: The Basics – Environmental Impact Assessments and Approvals of Projects (2013)
The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (Web Page, 2022) ‘Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights’ https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/special-rapporteurs/
Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36(2)(c) 25. ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 6; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 302 (entered into force 23 March 1976). ↑
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36: Article 6 (Right to Life), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 2018) I2 ;I3; I6; V62 . ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 6; art 7; art 27. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid art 27. ↑
Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recognized?’ (2006) 35(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 129, 140–2. ↑
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) art II (b-d). ↑
Ibid art 2. ↑
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 10). ↑
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature 10 September 1996, UN Doc A/50/1027 (in force 2021) art I; Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 7 July 2017, UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8 (entered into force 22 January 2021) arts 1, 4. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) (1938–41) 3 RIAA 1905. ↑
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) (1938–41) 3 RIAA 1905; Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253 258 [19]. ↑
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 55 [101]; Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 41 [53]. ↑
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
↑Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 18. ↑
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). ↑
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36: Article 6 (Right to Life), UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 2018) [26]. ↑
Statute of the International Court of Justice (n 3). ↑
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (n 13); Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (n 13). ↑
Charter of the United Nations, ch VII, art 38; art 39. ↑
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001). ↑
Ibid art 31; art 35; art 36; 37. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 6, art, 7, art 27 (n 4); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 6, art, 7, art 27 (n 4); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art 6, (n 4). ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 7 (n 4). ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 27 (n 4). ↑
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 50th sess, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) 38. ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). ↑
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Convention on the Rights of the Child (n 19). ↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 6, art, 7, art 27 (n 4); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 4). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 263 [105(2)(E)(33)] 1(a)(g); 6(1-3) 3-6 [90-103]. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) Art 35(3); 55. ↑
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992). ↑
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 40). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 1992). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (n 13). ↑
The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (Web Page, 2022) ‘Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights’ https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/special-rapporteurs/. ↑
Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Multilateral Assessment: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (Report, March 2012). ↑
Australian Government Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, National Environment Law: The Basics – Environmental Impact Assessments and Approvals of Projects (2013). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Charter of the United Nations (n 1). ↑